| The Commander in Chief Has Lost the Troops Nearly Three-Quarters of US Troops in Iraq Say End the Occupation Within a Year By Kevin Zeese January 24, 2006 A unique poll of active duty troops in Iraq shows a huge disconnect between the Commander in Chief and his troops in battle. It is evident that the President views the war very differently then the troops on the ground. The loss of the troops may be the final straw in the illegal occupation turned into a failed war. The foreign policy establishment had already told the President they thought the Iraq War was a mistake. The people have been saying the war was a mistake. All that is left are President Bush and the hawkish leaders of the two parties – only they are calling for staying the course or sending more troops. A poll by Le Moyne College and Zogby shows that if you want to support the troops you should be calling for an end to the war. An overwhelming majority, 72% of American troops serving in Iraq think the U.S. should exit the country within the next year. Among Reserves 90% favor withdrawal compared to 83% of the National Guard, 70% of the Army, and 58% of the Marines. Moreover, about three-quarters of National Guard and Reserve units favor withdrawal within 6 months. It seems Rep. John Murtha (D-PA), who has called for an immediate withdrawal to be completed within six months, is more in tune with the troops than their Commander in Chief. In a speech given on November 17, 2005 Murtha said: “The war in Iraq is not going as advertised. It is a flawed policy wrapped in illusion. The American public is way ahead of us. The United States and coalition troops have done all they can in Iraq, but it is time for a change in direction. Our military is suffering. The future of our country is at risk. We can not continue on the present course.” Even leading conservative commentators (Pat Buchanan, Francis Fukuyama, Paul Craig Roberts) now describe the invasion as a mistake and that the occupation has failed. William F. Buckley has called on the administration to admit defeat and change strategy. The poll also shows that the troops are confused by the mission in Iraq. Forty-two percent acknowledge their confusion. And, while 58% think they know why they are there in fact they are acting on inaccurate information. When troops are asked why they are in Iraq, 85% said it was “to retaliate for Saddam's roll in the 9-11 attacks” – when in fact Sadam had no role in 9-11. And, 77% of soldiers thought it was “to stop Saddam from protecting al Qaeda in Iraq” – again Sadam and al Qaeda were never allies, indeed they were enemies, the latter secular and the former religious. The troops have figured out that they are not there for the reason stated by the President – 93% recognize they are not there to remove weapons of mass destruction. The vast majority (76%) also do not believe that the United States is establishing a democracy that can be a model for the Arab world. But they do not accept that securing oil was the major purpose – only 11% accept that rationale. Not only do an overwhelming majority of soldiers in Iraq want the occupation to end rapidly but the foreign policy establishment of the United States is opposed to the war and is speaking out against the president's policies. These include:
These are just a few among many. In fact, in March 2003, shortly before the war began hundreds of retired military officers wrote President Bush requesting a meeting before a final decision was made to invade. They expressed grave concerns about a war with Iraq. Their letter foretold the future, saying: ". . .we strongly question the need for a war at this time. Despite Secretary of State Colin Powell's report to the Security Council and the testimony of others in the administration, we are not convinced that coercive containment has failed, or that war has become necessary. "Our own intelligence agencies have consistently noted both the absence of an imminent threat from Iraq and reliable evidence of cooperation between Iraq and Al Qaeda. Again, we question whether this is the right time and the right war. "Further, we believe the risks involved in going to war, under the unclear and shifting circumstances that confront us today, are far greater than those faced in 1991. Instead of a desert war to liberate Kuwait, combat would likely involve protracted siege warfare, chaotic street-to-street fighting in Baghdad, and Iraqi civil conflict. If that occurs, we fear our own nation and Iraq would both suffer casualties not witnessed since Vietnam. We fear the resulting carnage and humanitarian consequences would further devastate Iraqi society and inflame an already volatile Middle East, and increase terrorism against U.S. citizens." President Bush and his advisers ignored their request. The only other poll of US soldiers was reported by Military News this January. This poll of Military Times readers, who are more career and officer military, found large drops in support for the Iraq War. Over the course of the last year support for the Iraq War dropped 9 percent, and barely a majority, 54 percent, view the commander-in-chief's performance as positive. In 2004, 38 percent believed the U.S. was very likely to succeed in Iraq, in 2005 that was down to 31 percent.
Kevin Zeese is a candidate for Senate in Maryland ( www.KevinZeese.com ) and director of Democracy Rising (www.DemocracyRising.US).
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